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4ABSTRACT
The focus of the paper is to review the Terms of Reference (TOR)
of the Twelfth Finance Commission with special reference to Kerala.
It also critically examines the emphasis on fiscal deficit reduction without
paying attention to its quality and finds that this has led to the Centre
and the States resorting to a softer option of cutting productive capital
and necessary maintenance and social sector expenditure. This is likely
to have adverse consequences on equitable growth and to impede the
process of relieving the economy of structural constraints on growth.
There is an urgent need for analysing the quality of fiscal consolidation
instead of focusing merely on quantity of reduction of deficits as a
proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The study hence suggests
incorporating the concept of Quality of Fiscal Discipline.
It is found that there has been an enlargement of the scope of
Finance Commissions [since the Eleventh Finance Commission (11th
FC)] into mandates for recommending mechanisms for achieving
macroeconomic balance, equitable growth, and suggestions for
disinvestments and privatisation, while its role in the traditional area of
grant devolution has been restricted to non-Plan grants only. In fact, the
enlargement of the role in the traditional area of grant devolution would
be more desirable.
There is sufficient scope for augmenting resource mobilisation
from direct and indirect taxes at the Central level. Emphasis is to be
placed on integrating services and manufacturing into a single CENVAT
(Central Value Added Tax) and on direct taxes reform. The second
generation tax reform should concentrate on States’ tax administration
and inter-State coordination prior to moving on to a State level VAT.
There is need for a constitutional amendment to place service taxation
in the Concurrent List and enable States to tax more services.
5On the expenditure side, steep increases in items like wages and
salaries and interest expenditure are unlikely in the near future.
Hence maintenance and social sector expenditure should not be
sacrificed. At the same time, efficiency in spending and cutting
unproductive expenditure and leakages should be strictly monitored. A
decentralised district level monitoring system for maintenance
expenditure of capital assets is also suggested. The paper argues that
bringing privatisation in the Terms of Reference of the Finance
Commission seems avoidable. It is also felt that more effective time
bound implementation of State Finance Commission Reports is needed.
Along with devolution of funds, transfer of administrative functions is
necessary for avoiding duplication of expenditure.
As for Kerala-specific issues, it is found that achievements on the
human development front are not rewarded. Certain changes in the
existing criteria (of the Eleventh Finance Commission) are hence
suggested. Kerala’s tax effort, though better than richer States like Punjab,
is facing structural constraints. The fast expanding services sector is
outside the tax net of the State. The tax-GDP ratio of Kerala showed a
mild decline at 9.84 percent in the 1990s as compared to 10.29 percent
in the 1980s despite a much higher growth rate of State Domestic Product,
mainly because the State was not able to tax the dominant sector of the
State Domestic Product, that is, the services sector.
Key words :  finance commission, fiscal deficit, revenue mobilisation,
      devolution
JEL Classification : H77, H60, H20
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7Introduction
The scope of the paper is to briefly analyse the Terms of Reference
of India’s Twelfth Finance Commission with special emphasis on its
impact on Kerala. To get a holistic perspective, we summarise the
economic background for Central devolution of funds and the changing
role of the Finance Commissions over time. In the course of the
discussion, the concept of fiscal consolidation by targeting of deficits is
critically examined and the necessity for targeting expenditure and
revenue separately has been emphasised.
1. The Background
Role of Finance Commissions: A Brief Review
The Finance Commissions are constituted quinquennially as per
constitutional requirements. India being a country of vast regional
diversity and iniquitous distribution of natural resources, the ability to
mobilise revenue by the States differs. But in a federal set up, principles
of equalisation demands that citizens living in different geographical
regions with differing capacity to raise own revenues, should be able to
enjoy at least minimum amount of public services and the revenue
needed to provide these public services should be devolved to all
regions.  The diversity is the main reason behind the approach of fiscal
transfers to the States rather than the Centre providing the public services,
except those with substantial economies of scale. These traditional
principles of federal finance are the rationale behind the constitutional
8provisions for Finance Commissions and the criteria for devolution of
funds.  During the course of time arguments for expanding the scope as
well as the approach of the Finance Commissions beyond traditional
principles of public finance have been advanced and we shall examine
them in this paper.
The strategy during the 1950s was to embark on public sector-led
planned economic development aimed at developing a socialistic pattern
of society with the public sector attaining commanding heights of the
economy. This led to the pre-eminence of the Planning Commission,
though its role was not defined under the Constitution of India. The
States fixed their Plan sizes and the Planning Commission gave them
grants for financing the plans more than what they could afford with
their own internal resources. Till 1969, the Plan assistance from the
Centre was based on project basis. This was not problematic so long as
the revenue requirements were taken care of by the Finance Commissions,
in their totality, including what the execution of the Plans might call for.
During the First and Second Plans, the award of the Finance Commissions
took care of the revenue expenditure on account of the Plans as well.
Under the Gadgil formula used for devolution of Plan assistance after
1969, grants were given to finance the current expenditure to maintain
the assets created, in addition to loans, which were meant to finance
capital expenditure. The subsequent Finance Commissions (except the
ninth) took care of the needs of the States on non-Plan revenue account
only (11th Finance Commission Report, para 2.40,p.13).
The practice of financing Plan revenue expenditure by borrowing
(because the Plan revenue component is larger than 30 percent envisaged
in the Gadgil formula), resulted in a higher non-Plan revenue expenditure
after the plan period, thereby making the demands for devolution of
taxes and grants stronger and making the task of the Finance
Commissions that much tougher.
9The Gadgil formula of the late 1960s divided the distribution of
loans and grants of the Plan funds devolution in the ratio 70:30,
implicitly assuming that revenue and capital expenditure components
of the Plan will be in that ratio. The aim was to finance the revenue
expenditure out of grants and capital expenditure out of loans. But
subsequent experience showed that revenue expenditure component
was much higher, probably at 55 percent, resulting in financing of plan
revenue expenditure through borrowing and leaving a much higher
level of non-plan revenue expenditure after the plan period [See
Gurumurthi (2002), 11th FC Report p.13, for a discussion]1. A substantial
portion of Plan revenue expenditure is presently being met out of
borrowing. What is needed is replacing the present 70:30 ratio with a
more realistic one and leaves the entire grant devolution, Plan as well as
non-Plan, to the Finance Commissions. This should be done in
consultation with the Planning Commission for tackling the problem of
later non-Plan revenue deficits at the stage of formulation of Plan size
itself. For this, the constitution of the Finance Commission should
coincide with the beginning of the Five Year Plans, for effective co
ordination between Finance and Planning Commissions2 .
Though the scope of the Finance Commissions in the area of
grant devolution has become narrower, albeit by a self-imposed
restriction to devolve only grants to cover non-Plan revenue deficits, its
scope is being enlarged at the same time by making it recommend
measures for restructuring public finances of the Centre and the States
with the Terms of Reference entering into realms of macro economic
stability and equitable growth. Consider the following.
TOR No. 5 states
“The Commission shall review the state of finances of the Union
and the States and suggest ways and means by which the Governments,
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collectively and severally, may bring about a restructuring of the public
finances restoring budgetary balance and maintain macroeconomic
stability and debt reduction along with equitable growth”.
These are relatively new tasks [since the 11th FC)] assigned to the
Finance Commissions, which look into the sharing of taxes and
distributing grants-in-aid from the Centre to the States. Enlarging the
scope of recommendations to restructure the public finances to achieve
equitable growth, debt reduction and macro economic stability since
the 11th FC, has added significance as they have coincided with the
period of policies of economic liberalisation, especially since 1991.
With the Finance Commissions distributing grants-in-aid based
on non-Plan revenue gap, (i.e. an assessment based on the growth rates
applied by the Commission on the base year revenue and expenditure),
there developed a tendency among the States to incur expenditure in
excess of revenue and resort to borrowing. This was in the expectation
that the resulting burden of committed expenditure and revenue gap
would result in a higher devolution of grants-in-aid. In this process,
States with no revenue deficit did not receive any grants-in-aid, while
those with unbalanced budgets got away with their profligacy. This led
to a rethinking that called for normative criteria, instead of actual (11th
FC Report, Pp.15-16), namely what a State should practice instead of
what it actually practices, given its resource base. This started with the
Ninth Finance Commission. The inclusion of indicators of fiscal
consolidation started with the 11th FC. Let us briefly examine them
before proceeding to examine the TOR of 12th FC and the economic
reasoning on the appropriateness of the summary fiscal indicators in the
given national economic scenario and its implications for Kerala.
Though the role of the Finance Commissions in the traditional area of
grant devolution got restricted to only non-Plan grants, it is being given
a new role as a facilitator of fiscal reforms at the State level.
1 1
Finance Commission and Fiscal Reforms:  Highlights of the Eleventh
Finance Commission Report
There were two points in the TOR of the 11th FC which were
linked to fiscal consolidation
1) In TOR 4, the Commission was asked to suggest ways and means
to restructure public finances of the Centre and the States for
achieving budgetary balance and macro economic stability.3
2) Linking improvement in revenue budget to debt relief (for the
specific formula, see Appendix XI.1, p.314 of the 11th FC Report).
How the mandate of the TOR 4 was carried out by the 11th FC is
stated in Para 13.5 of the report (p.110).
“… The scheme envisages reduction of the combined fiscal deficit
of the Centre and the States from 9.84 percent in 2000-01 to 6.5 percent
in 2004-05. Revenue deficit will be reduced to 1 percent as against 6.77
percent at present. There will be no revenue deficit at the State level
though the Centre may have a revenue deficit of 1 percent. Fiscal deficit
of the Centre will decrease from 5.64 percent to 4.5 percent and that of
the States from 4.71 percent to 2.5 percent. Capital expenditure of the
Centre and the States (combined) should go up from 4.17 percent to
6.16 percent.”
In the 11th FC Report as well as the budget documents and the
Fiscal Responsibility legislations of the Centre and the States like Kerala,
the proportion of the summary indicators to the GDP and SDP has been
emphasised and taken as indicators for achieving fiscal consolidation.
Some comments on the impacts of this approach with respect to fiscal
deficit as a prime indicator may be in order here.
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2. Fiscal Deficit as a Proportion of GDP: A Reliable Measure of
Fiscal Consolidation?
Much emphasis has been laid on the proportion of fiscal deficit to
GDP/SDP as a summary measure of fiscal consolidation especially since
1991, when the Government of India officially brought in the concept
of fiscal deficit4 . Fiscal deficit as officially measured by the Government
of India is the difference between aggregate disbursements excluding
debt repayments and aggregate receipts net of debt receipts. One major
and most palpable defect of this indicator is that fiscal deficit can be
contained even while incurring more revenue deficit, by having a surplus
in the capital account. In other words, overspending for current
expenditures through borrowings at the cost of cutting down productive
investment can lead to a smaller fiscal deficit. In fact, this has been
happening throughout the 1990s in India.
 Besides these complications, there have been other problems
relating to definitional changes in fiscal deficit, which makes comparison
over time of the ratio of fiscal deficit to GDP difficult. For example,
borrowings from small savings have not been reflected in the Centre’s
fiscal deficit since 1999-2000, which makes the official fiscal deficit to
GDP ratio incomparable with that of the previous years5 .
Yet another method of reducing fiscal deficit is by treating
disinvestments proceeds as receipts. This was already questioned by
Gulati (1994), who visualised an extreme situation (stated as
hypothetical) of government selling off equity in public sector
undertakings but not utilising it for new public investments. In this
case, the amounts raised by the government go to finance the current
expenditure and it should actually be treated as raising the fiscal deficit
rather than reducing it6 .
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Emphasis on reducing fiscal deficit as a proportion of GDP, as the
Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Bill of the Centre and
the States like Kerala and the 11th FC report suggest, can result in Centre
and States resorting to the soft option of cutting capital investment
expenditure rather than the downward-sticky revenue expenditure.7
Of late, the official agencies have also joined the academic critics
in accepting that reduction of fiscal deficit alone is not a sufficient
indicator of fiscal improvement, i.e. by recognising the significance of
other indicators like revenue deficit and capital expenditure also in the
list.  But the pride of place is still occupied by fiscal deficit. Let us look
at why this is so.
Fiscal deficit is an indicator of the borrowings by the government.
The conventional argument is that higher borrowing by the government
crowds out the available funds for private investment and also raises the
interest rate thereby adversely affecting private investment. A higher
fiscal deficit is also expected to spill over to external sector. This argument
can be found in the Eleventh Finance Commission Report (Chapter III,
para 3.7, p. 19), Report on Currency and Finance 2001-02 of the RBI
and Srinivasan (2002). In the prevailing economic situation, none of
these is empirically tested in favour of the conventional arguments.8
To state in a nutshell
1) In a state of deficient private demand (see Table 1) and low credit
off-take, crowding out of funds for private investment does not
occur as there is excess liquidity in the system as can be seen from
banks investing in government securities in excess of statutory
requirements;
2) In a situation of excess liquidity and also when interest rates are
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partly administratively determined, a rise in interest as a direct
consequence of government borrowings is not likely;
3) Empirical results on the relation between interest rate and private
investment -although expected to be strong - are mixed in Indian
as well as international contexts. Another strong determinant is
private consumer demand, which in the latter half of the 1990s has
been falling; and
4) Government spending as a sustaining factor of economic growth
cannot be ignored.
The growth rate of Gross Domestic Product has declined since the
latter half of the 1990s and there is a clear association between this and
the decline in growth of PFCE. Only GFCE has shown a rise. Going by
the basic macro economic identity Y=C+I+G, we can see that had not
the GFCE grown at this level, the total growth rate would have been still
lower.9  This lends support to our proposition 4 made earlier.
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Figure1: Growth Rates of Private and Government Final
 Consumption Expenditure 1993-94 to 1999-2000 (%)
Source:  Computed from the data available in Hand Book of
Statistics on Indian Economy, 2002, Reserve Bank of India.
Note: PFCE= Private Final Consumption Expenditure,
GFCE= Government Final Consumption Expenditure.
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Before concluding our comments on TOR 5, let us look at the
merits of targeting another major deficit indicator, the revenue deficit.
Much of the revenue expenditure seems committed interest on
past borrowings. This is the result of a conscious policy decision as a
part of economic liberalisation that is putting an end to the earlier practice
of automatic monetisation of the gap between total receipts and total
expenditure by issue of ad hoc 91-day treasury bills at low rate of interest.
This is described as financial repression of interest rates on government
borrowing. Since April 1, 1997 the Central Government has been
borrowing from Reserve Bank of India through Ways and Means
advances and resorting to market borrowings at higher interest. This
shift in the mode of financing the deficit is one major reason for the
increasing interest payments in the revenue account.10  Given this
situation, scope for reduction of revenue deficit is limited and can fall
on expenditure on maintenance of capital assets, and at times on social
sector expenditure also. This will have adverse consequences for the
economy and hence the mere reduction of revenue deficit is also not
always desirable, if it is achieved by cutting down expenditure having
a significant positive impact on productivity of human capital and total
factor productivity of the economy. Reduction of revenue deficit will
be highly desirable if they are based on the following:
1) Reduction of the high cost debt through debt relief, a matter already
taken cognisance of by the Tenth and Eleventh Finance
Commissions;
2) Roll over of high cost debt by converting into new low interest
bearing loans, as suggested in budget 2003;
3) Setting a target for salaries and wage bill and any increases in
salaries by the Centre having a bearing on States to be implemented
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only after consultation with the States. Before implementing Pay
Commission reports, it should be mandatory that it should be
approved by a representative committee of State Chief Ministers;
and
4) Political consensus on levy of user charges on people who have
the ability to pay.
To put it briefly, though incurring of revenue deficit on an ongoing
basis is definitely a sign of imbalance, its reduction and phased
elimination is necessary but the ways through which it is achieved will
have impacts on achieving equitable growth as stated in Terms of
Reference 5. We have attempted in the foregoing paragraphs to point
out that reducing deficits, fiscal as well as revenue, should not be seen
prima facie as a sign of improvement of fiscal health. More important is
how it is achieved or what we may call “Quality of Fiscal Discipline
(QFD)”. We therefore attempt to define QFD as follows:
Fiscal adjustment can be described to be of high quality if
a) It is not achieved by reduction of productive capital expenditure,
especially in non-tradable infrastructure investment, essential for
relieving the structural constraints to growth (e.g. transport, water
control, electricity, air and sea ports and so on);
b) It is achieved by more revenue mobilisation without disturbing
the stability of tax system, i.e. frequent changes in rates, levy of
surcharges as a revenue gap filling measure, etc. Phased reduction
in tax arrears by collection and expeditious disposal of appeals
should be taken as a positive measure. In short, tax base widening
should be favoured to tax deepening;
c) Increasing tax-GDP ratio especially from under- taxed sectors with
high potential like real estate and construction sectors;
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d) Phased reduction of tax expenditure, that is cutting down of loss
of revenue through various selective exemptions and deductions
in the tax statute, as pointed out by the Kelkar Task Force;11
e) It is achieved by not cutting the maintenance expenditure for
upkeep of the capital assets created and by putting in place an
effective mechanism for monitoring this expenditure;
f) Maintenance of social sector expenditure, but with levy of user
charges from those with ability to pay; and
g) Progressive reduction of non-merit subsidies.
A composite index for QFD needs to be formulated12. This will
give weight to quality of reduction of deficit instead of merely a
quantitative reduction. This is essential if principles of devolution and
resource mobilisation should lead to achievement of equitable growth,
which has been incorporated as a new terms of reference in the Twelfth
Finance Commission. This being a very important aim, it is felt that the
norms of devolution of taxes and grants-in-aid should radically depart
from what has been followed hitherto.
When quality of expenditure and revenue mobilisation is closely
monitored and quality improvement achieved, quantitative reduction
will follow. A mere reduction of aggregate indicators like fiscal deficit
may mask the underlying fiscal imbalances and means of achieving the
reduction in deficit. Balakrishnan (1997) distinguishes between fiscal
responsibility and fiscal correction. Fiscal responsibility must be insisted
upon as an absolute criterion of good government, while fiscal correction
is interpreted as a reduction of fiscal deficit, no matter how it is achieved
and what the consequences are and it may not always amount to
responsible behaviour on the part of the government.13
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We suggest that in measuring the quantity reduction in indicators
like fiscal deficits, these quality factors should have positive and negative
weights so that we get a quality-adjusted reduction of deficits.
Alternatively, a weighted average of these factors itself can be treated as
a measure of fiscal discipline for devolution of grants-in-aid.
3. Resource Mobilisation by the Central Government: TOR 6 (i)
Resources of the Central Government for the next five years
commencing from April 1 2005, on the basis of levels of taxation and
non-tax revenues likely to be reached at the end of 2003-04.
Though this paper focuses on the impacts of the Terms of Reference
on the States, especially Kerala, it is necessary to analyse this TOR on
resource mobilisation of the Centre as the demand of the States for
increased Central share ultimately hinges on the size of the Centre’s
kitty, which is the direct consequence of the efforts and methods of resource
mobilisation by the Centre and the commitments in Central expenditure.
So analysing the position of the States without considering resource
mobilisation by the Centre will not present a holistic picture. Hence, we
proceed to examine the aspect of the problems and prospects of resource
mobilisation and trends in expenditure of the Central Government.
As far as the resources of the Central Government are concerned,
excise duty is still the most important source of revenue, with customs
duty revenue declining and presently equalling the corporate tax
followed by personal income tax. The conventional wisdom and
experience of western countries show that as a country reaches higher
stages of development, the proportion of direct taxes in total revenue
rises at the cost of commodity and consumption based taxes. In the
decade of the 1990s, there was indeed a buoyancy of direct taxes, but
much is left desired as a perusal of the report of the Kelkar Task Force on
indirect and direct taxes reveals.
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In view of the burgeoning interest payment burden and other
committed expenditures, the Central Government is also faced with the
necessity of augmenting revenues. Let us look at a few areas of
administrative and economic problems of resource mobilisation by the
Centre and how they are interlinked with the States’ finances through
tax devolution and grants-in-aid. The Economic Survey 2003 pointed
out that while the States’ own tax revenues registered a marginal
improvement during the period 1990-91 to 2001-02, the shortfall in
growth of central revenue has constrained the revenue receipts of the
States (Economic Times, February 28, 2003: 8)
Direct Taxes Front
The major direct taxes of the Central Government are 1) corporate tax
and 2) personal income tax. Among other direct taxes only wealth tax has
been retained. Taxes like Estate Duty, Gift Tax, and Interest Tax have
been deleted over the period of time (the latter two during the 1990s and
the scope of wealth tax considerably reduced by raising the exemption
limit to Rupees 15 lakhs and items of levy restricted). Previously 85
percent of the personal income tax was shared with the States while corporate
tax was not shared. The Eightieth Constitution amendment changed it
to a percentage of the pool of the central taxes. Let us look at the trend
of the direct tax collections over time especially during the 1990s.
Table1: Taxes as a Proportion of GDP
Tax 1975-80 1985-90 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1999-00
Personal Income Tax 1.24 1.03 1.09 1.12 1.21 1.38
Corporate Tax 1.19 1.07 1.27 1.27 1.34 1.55
Union Excise Duty 5.00 4.89 4.56 4.39 4.04 3.26
Customs Duty 2.12 3.94 3.61 3.38 2.86 2.47
Source: [Bagchi (1997), 11th FC Report, p.27]
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Personal income tax as a proportion GDP has been almost stagnant
and is below the level of what it was during 1950-51 (1.43 percent of
GDP), at the close of the century. When the economic growth rate during
the fifty-year period has gone up significantly, the personal income tax
collection has not kept up with it. Kelkar Task Force had taken note of
the necessity for direct taxes reforms. While it is true that direct taxes
have shown more buoyancy than indirect taxes, augmenting revenues
from these is still possible.
Though tax administrative reforms are important, institutional
mechanisms of Centre-State governments exchanging information is
necessary.14  Corporate tax and personal income tax trends are linked to
economic growth and increase in incomes.  It is suggested that along
with the tax administrative reforms initiated to enlarge the information
base to check tax evasion, elimination of complicated exemptions and
deductions for computation of corporate and personal income taxation
will result in rise in effective tax rate.
Indirect Taxes Front
As per the budget 2003, 58 percent of the total tax revenue is from
indirect taxes, with union excise duty contributing to 38 percent and
customs 20 percent. We can reasonably expect customs duty rates to
stabilise, after a continuous fall in the 1990s as part of the import
liberalisation strategy. The peak duty has almost come down from 110
percent in the 1980s to 25 percent in the budget 2003. With the duty
rates stabilising, revenue fall from customs duty may not happen further.
(Though this is also linked to economic growth and import elasticity of
rising incomes). But customs revenue cannot be that important in the
future as it used to be in the past as rate increase above certain levels will
not be possible due to WTO stipulations. The area of concentration in
indirect taxes is to be on union excise. The revenues from union excise
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duties as a percentage of GDP is also stagnating and even showing a
mild decline. This can be partly attributed to slowdown in the growth
rate of manufacturing sector output in the second half of the 1990s. Yet
another strong reason could be exclusion of many services from
taxation.15  Since many services go into the pre-manufacturing and post-
manufacturing stages, a Value Added Tax need to consider services and
manufacturing together.
The States also presently have the power to levy tax on purchase
and sale of goods. At the second stage, Value Added Tax (VAT) including
services should be introduced in all States simultaneously. Presently,
the State level implementation of VAT has been postponed. There has
been political as well as fiscal interest-based opposition to VAT.
We do not intend to go into the details of merits and demerits of a
VAT.  But one thing is very clear. Present tax competition by the State
governments is unsustainable from the revenue and fiscal sustainability
of State governments. Hence emphasis on implementation of VAT at the
State level also needs to be considered as a revenue augmenting measure.
Shome (2002) has discussed elaborately the administrative and other
problems when attempting to implement VAT at the State level. The
inclusion of inter-State trade in VAT is one issue and all States
simultaneously agreeing to implement VAT are even more important,
else the system will fail. There can also be administrative cost of tracking
down evasion by producing bogus invoices to claim false credit of
input taxes, at least in the beginning till a database of information and
inter-State linkages of information sharing are established. Given the
State of tax collection machinery these changes can take considerable
time and require attitudinal changes for a new working environment
where tackling evasion is by utilisation and sharing of information and
not by policing methods. Still an eventual movement towards a Value
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Added Tax first at Central and then at the State level by bringing services
substantially into tax net is an aim to be strived for in the larger interests
of non-cascading resource mobilisation.  But at the State level substantial
efforts at inter-State coordination and tax administrative reforms have
to precede the movement towards a VAT, else it can result in more loss of
revenue through fraudulent claims for tax credit.
In sum, direct taxation and commodity and service taxation require
streamlining as well as reforms, as the earlier practice of reliance on
customs duty as a major source of revenue may not be possible in the
future due to the liberalisation of trade.
4. Expenditure of the Central Government: TOR 6(ii)
“The demands on the resources of the Central Government, in
particular, on account of expenditure on civil administration, defence,
internal and border security, debt servicing and other committed
expenditure liabilities.”
Since the early1980s the Central Government has been incurring
revenue deficit. But States had revenue surplus/balance almost till the
late 1980s. It is commonly hypothesised that States’ revenue accounts
went into deficits with the implementation of the Fifth Pay Commission
Award, which was rather imposed by the States which had to accept it as
a fait accompli as the decision to implement it was taken by the Centre
unilaterally.16  Considering the overall picture of the States, it is worth
examining whether the implementation of the Fifth Pay Commission
award was the starting point of the explosion of wages and salaries bill
or was the culmination of a gradual increase in size of the State
bureaucracy over a period of time. Virmani (1990) found that in public
consumption, the ratio of wages and salaries to income grew at a faster
rate than that of commodities to income during the 1970s and 1980s.
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Real government wage rates have increased since 1973 and there has
been what is described as ‘Grade Inflation’, that is a shift in the structure
towards higher grades. The State governments’ real wage bill was the
highest among the three levels of the government. The growth of
employee compensation at the State government level has been faster
than that in the Central Government. The period 1983 was followed by
revision of salary by the Fourth and Fifth Pay Commissions. The point
sought to be emphasised here is that even prior to the revisions of pay
by these two Pay Commissions, there has been a faster growth rate of
employee compensation at the State government level. The signs of
unsustainability were there even before. The interest rates in the Centre’s
expenditure shot up also due to the decision to change the mode of
financing deficits from automatic monetisation. States never had that
facility in a federal set up and had been facing a harder budget constraint
than the Centre all along. Hence the deficits, especially revenue deficits,
create the problem of debt sustainability more for the States.
In the near future, it is not likely to expect a rise in wages and
salaries as it happened after the Fifth Pay Commission award. The
Eleventh Finance Commission has made certain recommendations in
this regard (para 3.5, Pp.35-36). The important ones are  (a) not to appoint
Pay Commissions as a matter of routine when there is neutralisation for
increase in prices for all categories of employees, and (b) consultation
with States before implementing recommendations of Pay Commissions.
Yet another reason is that the bargaining power of the organised labour
appears to have received a set back following the inability to meet with
success in agitations for retaining certain existing (and long enjoyed)
monetary benefits, which have been taken away by various State
governments citing fiscal crisis as a reason (government employees
strike in Kerala during February 2002 and in Tamil Nadu in July 2003).
The interest payment burden is also likely to decline as the Centre has
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already announced rescheduling of previous high cost debt into low
cost fresh loans. The low interest rate regime may not be reversed in the
near future.
 The optimistic expectation on the current expenditure side of the
Centre as well as the States is that the committed expenditure will not
increase disproportionately to crowd out productive expenditure.17  The
need is to monitor and check any wasteful and unproductive expenditure
while not compromising on maintenance and social sector expenditure
and take measures for realising resource mobilisation potential, there
by ensuring a quality of fiscal balance and not a mere reduction in ratios
of deficit to output without caring for the means by which it was achieved.
This is important for both Central and State Governments.
Maintenance Expenditure and it’s Monitoring: TOR 6 (vi)
“The expenditure on the non-salary component of maintenance
and upkeep of capital assets and non-wage related maintenance
expenditure on plan schemes to be completed by 31st March 2005 and
the norms on the basis of which specific amounts are recommended for
the maintenance of capital assets and the manner of monitoring such
expenditure.”
There is a general agreement that capital investment expenditure
is productive and current expenditure is not.18  Equally important is the
aspect of keeping capital assets created in a running condition, else
capital investment becomes capital waste with the assets not functioning
during their productive life period. Hence the emphasis placed on
maintenance expenditure by the 11th FC and the 12th FC is well deserved.
Since maintenance expenditure is revenue and non-Plan, in the eagerness
to cut deficits and show surpluses or low deficits in these accounts, the
axe often falls on this expenditure. Expenditure like interest payments
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and other expenditure such as subsidies championed by interest groups
are often spared.  It is hoped that the specific attention given to this
expenditure by the Finance Commissions will help to curb this tendency.
Maintenance expenditure as a proportion of revenue expenditure
in Kerala was approximately 3 percent till 1999-2000 and came down to
2.3 percent in 2000-01 and 2001-02 (Economic Review, 2002: 18). The
trend of decline in maintenance expenditure was observed by the Tenth
and Eleventh Finance Commissions and the latter (para 5.56, p.52)
mentioned the lack of transparency in the expenditure accounts of the
State governments regarding maintenance expenditure. The Tenth Finance
Commission recommended the constitution of a high powered committee
of senior officials chaired by the Chief Secretary for quarterly monitoring
of the utilisation of funds to ensure that the funds allocated are not diverted
to other areas. The 11th FC has observed that nothing much has been done
in this regard and expenditure levels still continue to be far below the
amounts provided by the 10th FC.  As stated earlier, one reason attributable
to this is the eagerness to control the non-Plan revenue expenditure as
reduction of revenue deficit achieved by whatever means is rewarded.
We suggest that the monitoring mechanism be decentralised to
the district level by including peoples’ representatives and heads of
local bodies, rather than at the level of the top State bureaucracy. This
may ensure better attention as a result of the inclusion of prominent
citizens and local bodies.
Pricing of Public Utilities and Privatisation:TOR 6(vii)
“The need for ensuring the commercial viability of irrigation
projects, power projects, departmental undertakings, public sector
enterprises etc. in the States through various means including adjustment
of user charges and relinquishing of non-priority enterprises through
privatisation or disinvestments.”
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This has wide ramifications and presupposes certain value
judgements. While there can be no dispute in collecting user charges for
services from those with the ability to pay and preventing the flow of
subsidies to the unintended [like camouflaging of unmetered supply of
electricity in many States as free power supplied to farmers] it has to be
noted that higher cost of operational inefficiency should not be transferred
to the customer. To state in other words, many of these service providers
should undergo efficiency-oriented reforms, which does not necessarily
mean privatisation and inducing competition. Take the example of power
sector. It is a case of natural monopoly and inducing competition may
involve welfare losses (Kannan and Pillai 2002). Reforms can also be
carried out by retaining public ownership, provided managerial
autonomy, freedom of decision-making and performance based
incentives are introduced in public enterprises. In fact, public investment
in infrastructure and non- tradable has a crowding-in effect on private
investment and private ownership in these areas has not been success
stories.
Withdrawing from non-priority areas is also mentioned. The word
priority is heavily loaded and can differ depending on differences in
perspectives. Assuming that it is meant to refer to public production of
private goods, the motive for privatisation and disinvestments should
be clear. It should not be for meeting the fiscal deficit target. The
transparency in sale is another issue. Though we do not propose to enter
into the wider issue of privatisation of public enterprises here, we cannot
avoid discussing why this issue should be linked to constitutional
devolution of taxes and grants-in-aid. This gives rise to the reasonable
presumption that disinvestments proceeds are expected to enter as
receipts and thereby reducing of deficits. This sort of deficit reduction
does not constitute a quality-based reduction for reasons discussed earlier.
The option of privatisation or otherwise, could have been left to the
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respective governments. Here privatisation is implicitly treated as the
only answer to the problems of the public sector undertakings and
devolutions of taxes and grants-in-aid as per constitutional requirements
are being attempted to be linked to this. This, if made a condition of
transfer of grants-in-aid, it is likely to affect States like Kerala where
privatisation of public undertakings is a politically sensitive issue and
needs to be undertaken with caution after exploring other options and
perhaps as a last resort19.
5. Devolution of Funds to Local Bodies-TOR 4 (iii)
“The measures needed to augment the Consolidated Fund of a
State to supplement the resources of the Panchayats and Municipalities
in the State on the basis of the recommendations made by the Finance
Commission of the State.”
Though the appointment of the State Finance Commissions (SFC)
has been made a constitutional requirement, they have so far not been
synchronised with the appointment of the Central Finance Commission’s
Report. It needs to be stipulated that the State Finance Commission’s
report should be laid within two years in the State Assembly and
recommendations should be acted upon within six months’ of
submission. The devolution of grants from the Centre to the States in
fourth and fifth years of the quinquennial period should be conditional
on States implementing the SFC recommendations.
Along with expenditure devolution, control over administrative
machinery should also be given to the local bodies, else it will result in
duplication of bureaucratic apparatus.
Panchayats’ and Municipalities’ revenue enhancing powers,
though limited, should be utilised more effectively in the levy of existing
professional and building taxes. Many non-monetary perquisites, which
2 8
escape professional taxation, should be evaluated and taxed. This will
not amount to double taxation, as profession tax is deductible in
computation of Central Income tax.
Building valuation guidelines for levy of building tax need
periodic up gradation and should be realistic so that litigation free
revenue can be mobilised
There is a suggestion for levy of user charges, which will help
local bodies in floating municipal bonds for mobilising funds through
the market routes instead of burdening the State government with debt
guarantee and going for the soft option of floating SLR bonds (Reddy
1997). The social equity implications of this will have to be thought
through.
Some of the service taxes (now selectively taxed by the Centre
and to a very limited extent by the States), at least those not having
inter-State ramifications, if assigned to States can augment the
Consolidated Funds of the States and a part of this can be devolved to
panchayats as per recommendations of the SFCs.
It needs to be considered whether the Central Finance Commission
should have the State devolution to the local bodies as a Terms of
Reference at all. With some changes in mechanism, i.e. by synchronising
the constitution of State Finance Commissions (SFCs) and the Central
Finance Commissions, making the mode of implementation of
recommendations on devolution of taxes and grants by the State to the
local bodies by the SFCs on the same pattern as the mechanism of
implementation of the Central Finance commission’s recommendations
on devolution, the matter can be taken out of the purview of the Central
Finance Commission. But in the initial stages, till the systems of SFCs
become set, Central Finance Commissions may make recommendations.
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But the devolution of funds should be based solely on transfer of funds
and functions to the local bodies and not based on criteria devolved by
the 11th FC, which have been the subject of critical comments. If criteria
like population is given 40 percent weight as done by the 11th FC,
States, which have been neglecting the process of decentralisation, will
benefit, whereas States like Kerala, which have pioneered
decentralisation much before it became a Constitutional requirement
will suffer.
We have already discussed TOR 8 by commenting on the
importance of the means of achieving fiscal consolidation. We will
discuss TOR 9 with reference to the Kerala’s example.
6. Human Development and Investment Climate: TOR 9
The Commission may, after making an assessment of the debt
position of the States as on 31st March 2004, suggest such corrective
measures, as are deemed necessary, consistent with macro-economic
stability and debt sustainability. Such measure recommended will give
weightage of the performance of the States in the fields of human
development and investment climate.
When a region (State in this case) achieves a high level of human
development, it will be reflected in a higher government spending.
Though human capital formation has been recognised as a total factor
input in growth accounting exercises, it is to be noted that government
spending in this area will not reap contemporaneous economic returns
and will essentially involve spending in areas, which are classified as
‘revenue expenditure’ and ‘non-plan revenue expenditure’. When
educational facility is extended to all economic groups, instant cost
recovery will be low, though in the medium term and long-term, it
improves the productivity of human capital, which can have
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considerable positive externalities. We would argue that the remittances
from Gulf, made possible by large-scale migration in the previous decades,
was a consequence of the minimum level of education provided to all by
the State Government. While Kerala benefited by this international labour
migration, it needs to be recognised that the country as a whole also
benefited in terms of significant flows of foreign exchange for a
considerable period of time (Recall the speech of Dr.Manmohan Singh,
the then Union Finance Minister in Parliament 1991-92). Even inter-
State migration and comparative advantage in the job market is due to the
better quality of human capital formation. Due to a number of factors that
are beyond the control of the State, the regional economy of Kerala could
not find private and public capital investment commensurate with its
level of human development. It is sought to be pointed out that in the face
of mobility of educated labour as a factor of production, and regional
economies being open economies, even the medium-term and long-term
benefits of spending on the social sectors like education and health may
not be entirely reaped by them. In short, the spillover effects of spending
for the formation of a quality human capital by a State like Kerala over a
period of time may have been enjoyed by other regions in the country.
Investment climate has been mistakenly associated with providing
competitive fiscal incentives by the States. This especially so, when the
licensing system has by and large been scrapped and the States compete
for private investment. Though this may be an important factor in
attracting investment it could result in erosion of the tax base of the
States. Productive and educated human capital is also an important
factor in determining the investment climate of a State.
As regards the debt position, States whose debt–SDP ratio is less
than all States average or whose debt-SDP ratio has not had a significant
growth over a period of, say, twenty years may be considered for debt
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relief, especially if the States have a higher than all States component of
high cost debt (e.g. Small Savings, Provident Funds and from other
items in the Public Account). Other criteria like tax effort may also be
considered while granting debt relief.
7. Kerala and Central Devolution of Funds
The Terms of Reference of Twelfth Finance Commission: Their Likely
Impact on Kerala
According to the Kerala Government, the Central devolution to
Kerala decreased after the implementation of the Eleventh Finance
Commission’s recommendations. The following table illustrates this.
Table 2: Summary of impact of 11th FC Recommendations
on Kerala’s Share (in %)
Estimated loss
Population Share of Share of Share of over that of the
Share Taxes Grants Total Tenth FinanceTransfers Commission
Recommendations
Tenth FC 3.438 3.598 2.489 3.407
Eleventh FC 3.490 3.057 1.387 2.832 Rs.3664 Crores
Source:  Economic Review, Kerala 2002, Table –2.25 p.18
The reason mentioned in the Economic Review, 2002 of the
Government of Kerala, for this loss is the change in formula for devolution
of funds by the 11th FC. Let us very briefly examine this.
Instead of distinguishing between shareable and non-shareable
taxes, a share of 29 percent of net20  proceeds of central taxes and duties
was recommended to be distributed among all the States, with an
additional 1.5 percent of net proceeds of central taxes and duties in a
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year was supposed to be distributed to the States which did not levy
sales tax on sugar, textiles and tobacco during that year. The criteria of
the devolution of taxes are given in Table 3.
Table 3: 11th FC Criteria for Devolution of Taxes (Percent)
Criterion                     Relative Weights
Tenth FC Eleventh FC
Population 20 10
Income (Distance Method) 60 62.5
Area 5 7.5
Index of Infrastructure 5 7.5
Tax Effort 10 5.0
Fiscal Discipline ---- 7.5
Source: 11th FC Report, Table 6.2, p. 58
As can be seen from the Table 2, the loss is mainly on account of
declining share of grants-in-aid. Under Article 275 (1) of the Indian
Constitution, the Finance Commission devolves grants-in-aid to States,
which have a deficit in non-plan revenue account after devolution of
Central taxes. Since Kerala has surplus, according to Finance
Commission’s estimates in non-plan revenue account after devolution
of Central taxes, it has not been given any grants-in-aid under Article 275
(1).
Before examining how each criterion will affect Kerala, let us
make a mention about the logic behind transfer of funds from the Centre
to the States.
1) The State’s expenditure obligations far exceed their share in overall
revenue of the Centre and the States;
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2) In a federal set up, richer States, in view of their higher revenue
capacity can provide better standards of public service than their
poorer counterparts. To offset this disadvantage, equalising
transfers are necessary; and
3) The transfers should not only offset fiscal disadvantages from a
lower revenue capacity but also the higher unit cost of providing
public services [See Rao (1997) for a discussion on these points].
It is because of these traditional principles that population, the
distance of the State’s per capita income from the highest, etc. became the
criteria for devolution of central funds. Over a period of time, additional
indicators like tax effort, fiscal discipline, index of infrastructure also
became the criteria, perhaps with the aim of rewarding States, which perform
well in these areas. With vast regional (both inter-State and intra-State)
inequalities, it can be argued that the time has not come to discard the
indicators like population, distance method, area etc. However, it is to be
recognised that some modifications and additional indicators are required
to reward States which have achieved a high level of human
developments-increasingly being recognised as the overarching goal of
economic development, among which Kerala is of course the front ranking
State in India. The modification will become necessary in view of the
Terms of Reference 9 of the Twelfth Finance Commission, which stresses
on human development and investment climate. Here the achievements
in human development and investment climate are sought to be linked
to macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability (See Paragraph 7 for
a discussion).  Let us briefly discuss the criteria used by the Eleventh
Finance Commission for devolution of funds and need for changes.
(a) Population:  This indicator needs modification. Kerala had
suggested before the 11th FC for inclusion of criteria like proportion of
population above 60 years and density of population. It is suggested
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that fifty percent of the devolution based on population criterion should
be based on weighted average of the indicators of achievements like a
low level of Total Fertility Rate (below the National Average), life
expectancy (above the National Average) and a measure of health care
(Coverage of Population by Primary Health Care Centres). To start with
the devolution based on these indicators can be fifty percent of the
weight for the Population criterion, but should be progressively increased
and over a period of time replacing population as a criterion for
devolution of funds. This approach will reward the States striving to
attain a faster demographic transition as well as enhance the quality of
population.
Given the national objective of reducing the population growth
rate, this criterion would go against the performing States like Kerala,
Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh with substantial achievements in
reducing population growth. The rigour of the population criterion will
of course be felt less by the achievers since the Terms of Reference takes
the population based on 1971 census. Nevertheless the quality of
population achieved through a demographic transition need to be
explicity brought into the criteria for tax devolution to reward the
achievers.
b) Distance Criterion: This is in accordance with the traditional
principles of fiscal federalism. Kerala may not benefit much from the
present distance criterion. The 11th FC took the distance from the average
of the per capita incomes of Punjab, Maharashtra and Goa. Kerala is in
the middle- income group of States. Kerala’s position is 7. This criterion
was given weightage of 62.5 percent in the Eleventh Finance
Commission. Since per capita income is the basis for this criterion, there
is implicit weight given to population and this indicator will not benefit
States like Kerala.
3 5
c) Area:  This criterion is aimed at taking care of high unit cost of
providing public goods and incurring of heavy administrative
infrastructure in large States with sparse density of population.
This criterion is not a favourable one to Kerala with a small percentage
of area but with a high population density. A dynamic fiscal situation
requires that this criterion eventually needs to be phased out.
The infrastructure projects once established will have low marginal
costs and financing the pricing of utilities have to be through appropriate
tax and non-tax revenues. Specific handicaps in infrastructure will have
to overcome by project-specific loans and grants. The Eleventh Finance
Commission raised the share of this criterion from 5 percent by the
Tenth Finance Commission to 7.5 percent. It is suggested that the share
be reverted to 5 percent.
d) Index of Infrastructure:  This index takes care of the physical
infrastructure. Since human capital has come to be recognised as a very
important factor in attracting physical capital,21  it should be given
appropriate weight in the construction of index of infrastructure. The
maintenance infrastructure requires expenditure and consequent stress
on the fiscal situation. States with high achievement in infrastructure
index needs to be given higher up gradation and maintenance grants
also, as an incentive for achievement and as a necessity for maintaining
and improving quality of infrastructure. In fact, there is a case for
considering giving special up gradation grants for States, which take
efforts to achieve a higher infrastructure index. It should be noted that
Kerala has a higher infrastructure index and ranks sixth (by CMIE
Infrastructure index) among the Indian States and Union Territories.
e) Tax Effort:  This is now measured by weighted tax-GDP ratio,
i.e. the ratio of per capita own tax revenue of a State to its per capita
income weighted by the inverse of per capita income. The 11th FC reduced
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this weight by 50 percent. The intention of the measure is to reward
poorer States, which exploited its tax base as much as a richer State.
Another measure suggested by Kalra (2001) is also worth considering
and it will be beneficial to Kerala for its tax effort. This measure is the
ratio of the Effort Relative to Capacity Relative. Capacity Relative
(CR) is computed as the ratio of the per capita income of the State to 14
representative States, whereas Effort Relative (ER) is the ratio of the per
capita tax to the average per capita tax of the 14 representative States.
In the devolution of funds based on tax effort the States with ER > CR
should get positive incentives. A portion of the devolution should be
set apart for the States on the criterion of ER > CR, whereas States with
ER < CR will not get any share from this part. Kerala has had ER>CR
throughout the three decadal periods of the 1970s, 1980s and the 1990s,
whereas richer States like Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra, Punjab and
West Bengal had ER < CR in 1996-97 (see Appendix 1 for full details of
the results of the measure). The weightage of this criterion reduced by
the 11th FC should be restored to the previous level of 10 percent or at
least to 7.5 percent (by adjusting the reduction for the Area criterion).
f) Fiscal Discipline:  According to the recommendations of the
11th FC, the improvement in the ratio of revenue receipts to revenue
expenditure from the base period (1990-91 to 1992-93) to the reference
period (1996-97 to 1998-99) and improvement of a State’s performance
is compared with the all States’ performance. As stated in the 11th FC
Report (para 6.33 p.58) this can be achieved by either raising revenue
receipts or reducing revenue expenditure. As pointed out earlier in our
discussion, this measure needs to be modified by including incentives
and disincentives for quality of revenue expenditure reduction since
equitable growth is part of TOR of the 12th FC and for that social sector
spending by the government is very important. Appropriate negative
and positive weights for compression and expansion of this expenditure
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may be introduced based on, what we have proposed here, the Quality
of Fiscal Discipline (QFD).
Traditional  Devolution  Criteria  and  Kerala
Kerala does not stand to benefit from the traditional criteria of
fiscal federalism, i.e. backwardness, population, area etc.  But in a
dynamic situation the conventional criteria of fiscal devolution should
be harmonized with the second generation problems of the States like
Kerala, which have achieved a high level of human development, though
at a fiscal cost. The provision of education and health care by the State
had its own fiscal implications. Social and Community services
expenditure are highly revenue expenditure-intensive. According to
estimations by the Eleventh Finance Commission Kerala has been taking
above average tax effort. It is the second-generation problems that are
not getting their due attention in the devolution of Central funds to
Kerala. To illustrate a few
1) High level of educated unemployed,
2) Fiscal strains affecting State-sponsored health and welfare schemes
which do have a positive impact on human capital,
3) Deteriorating quality in higher education, and
4) High dependence on services sector, which is untaxable at the
State level.
The recovery of user charges from social and community services
like education has become very difficult due to emergence of strong
demand groups like students and teachers’ organisations22. Higher
education in the State is almost free and any move to impose user charges
is being opposed by student organisations of all political colours.
Traders’ resistance to sales tax enforcement machinery is very strong.
The political combinations in the State have not been able to
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strategically handle interest groups and make a break through in
mobilisation of resources. With stagnating revenues and high
expenditure commitments, the State’s fiscal situation has become
precarious, more so with a substantial portion of high cost debt, though
the trend in debt-SDP ratio has not been rising. But it has to be taken
note of that despite all these region-specific political economic
constraints; Kerala has been doing better than other States as far as
revenue mobilisation is concerned. We shall examine some of the aspects
of the State’s finances in the following paragraphs.
Trends in the Sectoral Growth Patterns in Kerala - With Emphasis
on Tax Base
That the Kerala economy is a service sector led one is quite well
known. In 2000-01, almost 56 percent of the State Net Domestic Product
emanated from the Services sector. The Table below shows the sectoral
composition  (Sectoral SDPs as a proportion of State SDP) of the Kerala
economy for the twenty-two year period from 1980-81 to 2001-02.
Table 4:   Decadal Sectoral Shares (%) in Kerala’s
SDP at constant prices (1993-94)
Year Primary Secondary Tertiary
1980-81 37 20 43
1990-91 34 19 47
2000-01 25 19 55
2001-02 25 20 56
Source: Computed from the data from the site
circonindia.com  and Economic Review
Within the service sector, changes have taken place in the sub-
sectoral shares (sub-sectoral SDP as a proportion of Sectoral SDP). The
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sub-sector Trade, Hotels and Restaurants, which occupied a 51 percent
share of Tertiary SDP, has come down to 35 percent and much of this fall
in share has been taken by the rising Transport, Storage and
Communication sub-sector. The growth rate of real estate sector is
stagnant and that of other services (which includes community and
personal services) is also coming down. Table 5 illustrates this.
Table 5:  Decadal Sub-Sectoral Shares in the
Tertiary Sector (%): 1980-81 to 1998-99.
Transport, Trade Banking Public
Year Storage & Hotels & and Real Admini- OtherCommuni- Restau- Insurance Estate stration Services
cations rants
1980-81 6 51 4 8 8 22
1990-91 9 42 10 10 11 18
1998-99 19 35 14 10 8 15
Source: Computed from data downloaded from
circonindia.com and Economic Review, Kerala
With the secondary sector (a major component of which is the
manufacturing sector) almost stagnating at 20 percent of State Net
Domestic Product, and trade hotels and restaurants share coming down,
the tax base for the present dominant taxes, like sales taxes, tax on
hotels etc. is coming down.
The fast growing sector appears to be transport, storage and
communications. Our emphasis should be on service taxation of this
sub-sector. The problem, which arises here, is that communication has
always been an exclusive Central subject and it will be difficult to
argue for states to get the power to tax these services. One suggestion
that can be made is that the tax collected on telephone services should
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be devolved to the states on the basis of tele-density23. (This of course
will require separate norms for devolution of the taxation of certain
select services by the Central Government. This can be thought of till
a Constitutional amendment putting services in the Concurrent list is
made and State’s authority regarding taxation of services clearly
delineated)24 .
Trends in Revenue Receipts, Tax Receipts and Public Debt
 Tax receipts as a proportion of revenue receipts went up from
57 percent during 1980-81 to 1990-91 to 70 percent in 1990-91 to
2001-02. Interest payments rose from 7.61 percent in 1980-81 to
25.68 percent of the revenue receipts in 2001-02. Public debt as a
proportion of SDP during the same period increased from 27.32 to
38.72.25  Let us examine the trend in tax receipts for the twenty-year
period. Picture 2 shows the actual and trend (with cyclical and
irregular fluctuations removed) of the tax revenue for the period
1981-82 to 2001-02. The structural growth path of the tax revenues
showed a downward movement throughout the 1990s, indicating
clearly that there are long-term constraining factors in the growth
rate of the tax revenues of the state. As we have seen from the sectoral
and sub-sectoral shares of the SDP, the base, on which the major tax,
sales tax, which forms 67 percent of the total tax revenue of the state
in 2001-02, is levied, is the stagnating secondary sector or the
declining trade, hotels and restaurants. The scope of the need to tax
the emerging sub-sectors within the service sector, which is currently
outside the scope of the States’ authority to tax, should be considered
in this context. The long-term declines in the tax revenues and
stagnation in the non-tax revenues pose a serious problem for resource
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Figure 2. Growth Rate and Trend of Tax Revenue Growth in Kerala
1981-2001
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Figure 3. Growth Rate of Non Tax Revenue and Trend 1981-2001
Source: Computed from Economic Review, 2002, Kerala
mobilisation. The composition of taxes needs to shift to the service
sector. The mild decline in tax-SDP ratio (at the All-India level also
tax-GDP ratio declined during the 1990s) from 10.29 percent in the
1980s to 9.84 percent in the 1990s, the decade that witnessed a fast
Source: Computed from Economic Review 2002, Kerala
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average growth rate of SDP at 6 percent also reflects the inability to
tax the emerging service sector.
Criteria of Central Devolution- Adverse Impacts on Kerala
Kerala has been a victim of the normative criteria adopted for
the devolution of grants under Article 275 by the Finance Commissions
to cover non-plan revenue deficits. The Eleventh Finance Commission
estimated post tax devolution non-plan revenue surplus for Kerala.
The actual Balance of Current Revenue shown in the budgets reveals
that the State has deficits in non-plan revenue account.  The
normative criteria have been out of touch with reality and need to be
abandoned. The actual of the State expenditure and receipts could
be made the basis for devolution of grants under Article 275 and
certain items in non-plan expenditure can be made ineligible for grants.
The criteria for
Figure 4. Central Shares as a Proportion of Revenue Receipts 1980-
81 to 2001-02
Devolution of taxes has not been favourable to Kerala as can be
seen from the trend of Central share in the revenue receipts of the State.
The loan and grant component of 70:30 as per the Gadgil formula adopted
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by the Planning Commission has been unfavourable to the States,
especially Kerala where the capital component is less than 25 percent.
The Central share as a proportion of revenue receipts has come down by
2 percentage points, from 32 percent in the 1980s to 30 percent in the
1990s implying that the formulae of devolution of fund by the Finance
Commissions and Planning Commissions give a large explicit and
implicit weightage to population and this has become unfavourable to
States like Kerala which have undergone a demographic transition.
Besides, criteria like Distance, with a weightage of 62.5 percent in the
Eleventh Finance Commission, also are unfavourable to Kerala, since it
has an implicit population weightage through the inclusion of per capita
incomes.
In this context another suggestion that came forward26  is that out
of the Finance Commission devolution of the taxes, 50 percent may be
based on criteria and 50 percent on budgets, though the budget
performance indicators will have to be formulated and may not always
be beneficial. But the preponderance of Population and Area as indicators
(in Gadgil formula for transfer of Plan assistance, population gets 55
percent weight) is not in the interests of the State.
Public Debt of Kerala
The trend of the growth rate of public debt in Kerala has not been
rising. When we take the debt-SDP ratio, the trend showed a fall in the
1990s, before rising in the late 1990s, when the SDP growth rate also
slowed down during the late 1990s and there has been increasing burden
due to pay revision of the Government employees.
When we empirically verify the growth rate of debt-SDP ratio, it
has not been statistically significant during the 1990s27 .
4 4
Figure 5. Growth Rate and Trend of Public Debt in Kerala:
1971 to 2001
Table 6:  Growth Rate of Debt-SDP Ratio in Kerala: 1980-2000
Period Coefficient Standard Error t-value t-probability
1980s 0.0187 0.0087 2.154 0.044
1990s -.00917 0.0078 -1.175 0.255
R2 = 0.196 Dw = 1.62 after AR (1) Correction.28
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But the fact that the growth rate of debt-SDP ratio has not been
significant in the 1990s does not indicate that the fiscal strength has
improved. (The trend growth rate of debt -SDP ratio is not statistically
significant for the period 1980-200129 ).  In fact the high cost component
of debt, indicated by a high level of borrowing from the public account
(Small Savings, Provident Funds, etc.) has gone up and this implies a
large outgo of interest payments from the revenue receipts, which has
reached 25.86 in 2000-01 from 7.61 in 1980-81. The fiscal problem is
exacerbated, even with a non-significant rise in debt- SDP ratio as high
cost component of debt has gone up, while own tax and non-tax revenue
as well as Central share of revenue receipts have been declining. The
State has been borrowing from sources like Toddy Tappers Welfare Fund
and Co operative Societies at very high interest rates of 14 percent and
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15 percent, according to Governmental sources. A detailed analysis of
the borrowings from the Public Account is necessary for getting a clearer
idea about the cost of borrowing.
The trend in public debt of Kerala, i.e. non-significant rise but
increasingly costly debt, strengthens the State’s case for higher
devolution of Central funds. Though there can be argument that more
own tax revenue needs to be mobilised, it is not a problem unique to
Kerala. When analysed for the Centre and all States also, the same
downward trend can be witnessed. But in Kerala’s case more emphasis
need be laid on non-tax revenues especially in social and community
sectors, like education and health, but a strategic tackling of the
demand groups is essential for its success. One of the main sources of
non-tax revenue from forests has come down after the ban on clear
felling.
If the main factors of fiscal crisis of Kerala are to be highlighted,
they will be
1) Increasing component of High Cost debt,
2) Resistance to levy of tax and non-tax revenue by demand and
interest groups,
3) Declining Central shares especially nil grants under Article 275
form the Finance Commissions due to application of Normative
criteria in estimating receipts and expenditure,
4) Unfavourable devolution criteria for taxes and grants by Finance
and Planning Commissions, and
5) Decentralisation of funds without full transfer of functions and
staff.
The solution to these problems is partly economic and
substantially political. The change in devolution criteria may not find
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support from States that stand to benefit from the present criteria. But
opinions of other States, which are also affected adversely, have to be
mobilised. Tackling of interest groups requires political consensus and
appropriate strategies and mobilisation of public opinion on the fiscal
situation so that there can be more mobilisation of non-tax revenue. To
overcome the traders’ resistance to sales tax enforcement, fundamental
tax administrative reforms and change in the mindset of enforcement is
called for. These can be done by stopping assessments based on pure
estimates, collection of evidence by strengthening information
mechanisms and encouraging voluntary compliance by presumptive
mechanisms and make selection for tax audit non-discretionary. The
second-generation problems after considerable achievements in social
sectors and human development and consequential fiscal strains have
to be stressed before the Finance Commissions. Another problem calling
for attention is high cost component of debt. Since the State has been
doing relatively better in tax effort, there is a case for debt relief by
making the non-significant increase of debt-SDP ratio and better tax
effort new additional criteria. There has to be internal efforts as well as
strong presentation of the Kerala’s arguments before the Centre to
overcome the fiscal problems faced by the State and this requires political
consensus.
8. Summing Up
The Finance Commissions, especially the recent ones, have been
given the task of recommending structural changes in public finances
of the Centre and the States and the Terms of Reference attempt to make
the Commission a vehicle for economic and fiscal reforms. But the
traditional area of the Finance Commission in tax and grant devolution,
especially the latter has become narrower, with the scope of looking at
only non-Plan revenue deficits. We suggest an enlarged role for the
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Finance Commissions in the traditional areas and leave the question of
economic and fiscal reforms to respective governments in consultation
with the Centre. The progress in achieving fiscal consolidation can of
course be used by the Finance Commissions as a criterion for tax and
grant devolution. But the concept of fiscal consolidation has to be
much more broad based with attention to details of expenditure and
revenue components than mere targeting of fiscal deficits. This is
necessary to achieve the objective of economic growth with equity.
States like Kerala, which are now facing second-generation
problems, are adversely affected by the traditional criteria for funds
devolution like population and area. In a dynamic situation, there is
need for change in criteria for devolution of funds to take care of the
needs of States like Kerala. Unless the second-generation problems
that have cropped up from the developmental experience of the past
50 years are recognised and factored into the federal financial relations
the credibility of this important institution may be increasingly called
into question.
K.P. Kannan is  Fellow and Director of the Centre for Development
Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.
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Notes
1 For States like Kerala the capital expenditure component of Plan expenditure
has been as low as 25 percent according to the Tenth Five Year Plan Document
2002-07, Volume III on State Finances published by the Planning
Commission, Government of India.
2 See the Report of the Eleventh Finance Commission on the experience in
getting information on completed Plan projects, which became necessary
for determining the maintenance expenditure part of the non-Plan account.
This problem could have been avoided had the constitution of the Finance
Commission been synchronised with the Five Year Plans (11th FC Report,
Paragraphs 5.51 to 5.53, p. 51)
3 This has been retained in the TOR of the 12thFC with the addition of the
words debt reduction and equitable growth.  This is an indication of further
enlargement of the scope of the Terms of Reference.
4 The fact that the acceptability of this measure has been challenged deserves
mention. Illustrative examples in the literature on this subject are Gulati
(1994), Rao and Amarnath (2000), Srinivasan (2000, p.48). Even the Union
Finance Minister’s Budget Speech, 2003 has to a certain extent recognised
this, by stating that revenue deficit is the main worry and not the fiscal
deficit. Rakshit (1991) and Balakrishnan (1997) have examined the
relationship between fiscal deficit and macro economic variables and found
practically no relationship. Balakrishnan (1997) points out that fiscal deficit
as an instrument of macroeconomic tool has weaknesses.
5 The Centre credits the States’ share of the small savings to the National
Small Savings Fund (NSSF) and this does not form part of the Central
borrowings since 1999-2000, whereas prior to 1999-2000, it formed part
of Centre’s borrowings. The ratio of division of small savings  between the
Centre and the States is 80:20.  Fiscal deficit as a proportion of GDP prior
to and after 1999-2000 is not directly comparable because of the change in
definition of Central borrowings.
6 Also see articles by Ize, Mansoor in Blejer and Cheasty (ed.) ‘How to
Measure Fiscal Deficit’  (1993) a publication of the International Monetary
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Fund, for a critical discussion on utilising disinvestment proceeds for
reducing fiscal deficit.
7 Here we should take note of the fact that revenue deficit reduction and raising
capital expenditure proportion have also been suggested by the 11th FC. We
shall discuss quality of deficit reduction later.
8 We are not entering into elaborate economic counter arguments to these
propositions, which of course have been made by Rakshit (1991), Patnaik
(2000), Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2002), Fazzari (1994),  Naastepad
(1999) etc.
9 This has been admitted by the Report on Currency and Finance 2000-01.
The 2001-02 report however, reverses the argument stating that a
deteriorating fiscal deficit due to rise in government expenditure has led to
a lower growth. But the more convincing argument is that in a situation of
deficient private demand along with a cut in government spending,  there
would have been adverse consequences on growth. It is noteworthy that
this deteriorating fiscal deficit did not result in a higher inflation in the latter
half of the 1990s, as there was excess capacity in the industry. This is a
situation where an increase in revenue expenditure helped in sustaining
growth, albeit in the short run. But having recognised by many that the
growth constraints in the Indian economy are structural (Karnik 2001,
Report on Currency and Finance 2001-02), an increase in capital spending
in infrastructure is the basic requirement for achieving a higher growth.
10 The advisability of monetisation of the part of the deficit has been discussed
by Ramachandran et al (2002)
11 To give examples, the phased reduction of deductions under Chapter VI A
of the Income Tax Act 1961, like 80HHC for export profits etc.
12 We recognise that this involves proper weightage to various aspects of
QFD. This could constitute an exercise in itself. Our intention here is to
emphasise the quality aspect. While doing so, we do not disregard the
quantity aspect of deficit. In fact, both are interconnected. If the quality
aspect suffers, i.e. by borrowing for current expenditure yielding no returns
to service the debt in future, inadequate mobilisation of revenue etc., it will
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result in splurging of future deficits. By emphasising on the quality aspect,
we are indirectly, taking care of the quantity aspect also.
13 It is to be taken note of that by arguing for looking beyond the summary
indicators like fiscal deficit and revenue deficit, we are not arguing for a lack
of fiscal prudence. In fact, stressing on aggregate indicators is a soft option
as this can be achieved by cutting capital expenditure and those components
of revenue expenditure, which are not championed by interest groups. When
we look at the quality of fiscal adjustment, we are in effect arguing for a
harder option, the implementation of which requires political consensus in
the long run interests of the economy and debt sustainability. Already the
public debt of the Centre and the States has been treated as unsustainable
(Buiter and Patel 1997, Reserve Bank of India, Report on Currency and
Finance, 2001-02).
14 The present co-ordination set up is not working effectively. To illustrate,
evaded income is many times camouflaged as agricultural income and
declared in income-tax returns as very high (mostly non-existent) agricultural
income. The Centre should pass on this information to the State tax machinery,
which can levy tax on self-declared agricultural income. To cite an example
of intertwining of tax base and how evasion hurts States twice, let us take
the example of real estate transactions. When the value of the immovable
property transacted is kept low in registered documents, a State loses stamp
duty on the unreported value. The Centre loses capital gains tax (which is
part of personal income tax) as the sale consideration reported is much
below the actual. Since personal income tax is devolved to the States, they
get a lesser amount. The State is hurt twice, first by loss of stamp duty and
then by lower devolution, as Centre’s kitty gets smaller due to capital gains
tax evasion. A mechanism to check stamp duty evasion at State level by
enforcing a reasonable guideline value for the purpose of stamp duty levy
and making it the basis for capital gains tax computation by the Centre is
necessary.
15 There is a service tax selectively taxing services at 8 percent and States are
also taxing some services. What is suggested is integration of services and
manufacturing into a single value Added Tax (VAT) at central and State
level. For a discussion, see Rao (2001).
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16 But one should take note of the fact that when the Fifth Pay Commission
award was implemented the United Front Government at the Centre with a
number of parties as coalition partners. Some of them were ruling the
States. The United Front Government had the outside support of the Congress
party. The opposition parties and unions were also supportive of the
implementation of the package. Though States were not formally consulted,
the political leadership of the parties ruling the States was seen as supoorting
the implementation of the Pay Commission award.
17 Productive expenditure need not always be capital expenditure. It can even
be revenue expenditure. It is noteworthy that the noon-meal scheme, which
was cited as an example of fiscal populism, is shown to have positive
impacts on enrolment ratios and preventing dropout rates (see article by
Jean Dreaze and Aparajitha Goyal in Frontline 15/08/2003). This will have
a long run positive impact on more productive human capital formation,
which will have a consequential positive impact on future economic growth.
Dreaze and Sen earlier made a similar argument and this has been critically
analysed by Shome (2002, pp.7-8).
18 There have been empirical studies disputing this. For citation and detailed
discussion, see Report on Currency and Finance, Reserve Bank of India
2000-01.
19 Here, we have an example of handing over to private sector a function that
is essentially in the domain of civic authorities, disposal of Municipal Solid
Waste in Thiruvananthapuram City. This is the first Build Operate and
Tranfer Scheme (BOT), according to the authorities of the private company.
This has neither resulted in efficient disposal of waste from the city nor
environmentally safe methods of disposal of inorganic waste. More often
than not, the plant stops working with the demand to the government for
captive markets from the government agencies for the bio-fertilizer at prices
higher than from others, according to the government sources. Now, there
is a demand that the municipal authorities should take over the plant. Some
clauses in the BOT agreement have landed Thiruvannathapuram Corporation
in huge liability to the private sector partner. The larger example of Enron in
Maharashtra is also there.
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20 The recommendation of the Tenth Finance Commission for transfer of 29
percent of gross proceeds was not accepted by the Centre. Article 270 (2)
after the Eightieth Amendment stipulates transfer of prescribed share of net
proceeds. Net proceeds are net of Union Territories share and cost of
collection of Central taxes.
21 Though not within the sub-national region as we discussed earlier, it needs
to be recognised that it plays a very important role in attracting physical
capital to a country (Mankiw 1995).
22 We are not in favour of taking a negative approach to the role of the mass
organisations of various sections of the people. Positive role played by
them in social empowerment and in the achievement of human development
indicators like literacy level needs to be acknowledged. But competitive
political compulsions have resulted in alluding emergence of consensus in
issues like levy of user charges for social and community services even
from those who have ability to pay.
23 Kerala will benefit from this as it is a state having very high tele- density
compared to the national average i.e., 8.4 per 100 and rural tele-density is
7.06 in 2002 (Economic Review 2002, p.229).
24 At present services taxation is in the Residuary List and in the exclusive
purview of the Centre, which selectively taxes services by increasing the list
of services taxed in every Finance Act. The States like Kerala which have a
higher share of services sector in State Domestic Product than the national
average are neither able to tax the services sector nor get any added share
from the devolution of service tax.
25 The Economic Review of Kerala describes 30 percent as a prudent debt -
GDP ratio. There are methods like Domar’s Stability equation, which
stipulates that the real growth rate should not exceed real interest rate in the
face of primary sector deficits. An alternative method of Buiter and Patel
used by the Report on Currency and Finance, 2001-02 of the Reserve Bank
of India lays down that the discounted present value of the future debt
should be stationary when tested for unit roots.
26 The suggestion came from Shri. K.V. Rabindran Nair, former Union
Expenditure Secretary and former Kerala Chief Secretary in the Workshop
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held in Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram on 29 August
2003.
27 This is done using the Kinked exponential method, with the kink assumed
at 1990.
28 The explanatory power of the model is low as the R2  is low.
29 The trend growth rate of debt-SDP ratio (DSDR)  was computed using the
model DSDR= a+  bDSDR
-1+ cTrend +Ut. The long- term trend growth
can be  computed as c/(1-b).  In this case the t-probability of the short-term
trend itself is not significant. The results of the regression are not reported
here.
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APPENDIX
Table A1: Capacity Relatives and Effort relatives of States (1996-97)
States Percapita Percapita Percapita Tax Effort Effort
Income Relative tax (ER) Relative
(CR)
Gujarat 14875 156 1332 9.6 120
Haryana 16392 150 1155 7.1 89
Maharastra 17666 162 1353 7.8 97
Punjab 18008 165 1223 6.7 84
Tamil Nadu 11708 107 1343 11.5 144
West Bengal 9579 88 571 6 75
Andhra Pradesh 10308 94 676 6.8 85
Karnataka 10504 96 1169 11.4 142
Kerala 10309 94 1269 13.9 174
Bihar 4231 39 242 6.3 79
Madhay Pradesh 7571 69 553 7.4 92
Orissa 5893 54 390 6.1 76
Rajasthan 8974 82 628 7.4 92
Uttar Pradesh 6713 61 402 6 75
Average Index 10909=100 8=100
Table A2: Capacity Relative  and Effort relative  of -
  State-wise Performane
States Group 1970-71 1980-81 1990-91 1996-97
ER>CR Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Tamil Nadu, Tamil Nadu,
Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka,
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Karnataka, Kerala, Bihar,
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh Madhya Pradesh Madhya Pradesh
Kerala, Bihar, Orissa, Rajasthan, Orissa, Rajasthan,
Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Uttar Pradesh
ER<CR Gujarat, Haryana, Gujarat, Haryana, Gujarat, Haryana, Gujarat, Haryana,
Punjab, West Maharashtra, Maharashtra, Maharashtra,
Bengal, Orissa, Punjab, West Punjab, West Punjab, West
Uttar Pradesh Bengal, Orissa, Bengal Bengal
Rajasthan,
Uttar Pradesh
ER=CR Madhya Pradesh
Source: Kalra (2001), p.189
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